Relations Between Units and Relations Between Quantities

The proposed revision to the International System of Units contains two features that are bound to be of special interest to those concerned with foundational questions in philosophy of science. These are that the proposed system of international units ("New SI") can be defined (i) without drawing a distinction between base units and derived units, and (ii) without restricting (or, even, specifying) the means by which the value of the quantities associated with the units are to be established. In this paper, I address the question of the role of base units in light of the New SI: Do the "base units" of the SI play any essential role anymore, if they are neither at the bottom of a hierarchy of definitions themselves, nor the only units that figure in the statements fixing the numerical values of the "defining constants" ? The answer I develop and present (a qualified yes and no) also shows why it is important to retain the distinction between dimensions and quantities. I argue for an appreciation of the role of dimensions in understanding issues related to systems of units

"Pictures, Models, and Measures" A contribution to Invited Symposium: "Wittgenstein's Picture Theory" at the 2015 Pacific APA Meeting

Putting Wittgenstein's writing into an historical context that includes scientific and technological developments as well as cultural and intellectual works can be helpful in understanding some of Wittgenstein's works. I focus on the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in particular in this paper, and on topics related to pictures and models: the development of audio recording technologies, the development of miniature scale models that were both aesthetically pleasing and scientifically useful, particularly in the forensics of traffic accidents, and the culmination of a centuries-long effort to articulate the method behind the use of physical modeling, i.e., the formulation of a concept presented in 1914 and dubbed "physically similar systems.

Relations Between Units and Relations Between Quantities

The proposed revision to the International System of Units contains two features that are bound to be of special interest to those concerned with foundational questions in philosophy of science. These are that the proposed system of international units ("New SI") can be defined (i) without drawing a distinction between base units and derived units, and (ii) without restricting (or, even, specifying) the means by which the value of the quantities associated with the units are to be established. In this paper, I address the question of the role of base units in light of the New SI: Do the "base units" of the SI play any essential role anymore, if they are neither at the bottom of a hierarchy of definitions themselves, nor the only units that figure in the statements fixing the numerical values of the "defining constants" ? The answer I develop and present (a qualified yes and no) also shows why it is important to retain the distinction between dimensions and quantities. I argue for an appreciation of the role of dimensions in understanding issues related to systems of units

Scale Modeling (Chapter 32, _Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Engineering_)

This chapter describes the role of scale modeling in engineering and related sciences. Accounts of scale modeling in philosophy rarely provide a correct description of how the practice is actually employed in engineering. This chapter corrects misconceptions about scale modeling often found in the philosophical literature. It also provides an informal explanation of how and why scale modeling works, when it does, in terms of an analogy between geometric similarity of plane figures and similarity of physically similar systems, which is founded on physics rather than on geometry. The key idea is to identify the relevant ratios responsible for the kind of similarity that is of interest, and then to characterize similarity in terms of a set of ratios that are the same (i.e., identical, or invariant) between the model system and the system it models. References to more extended treatments are provided for further reading

Scale Modeling (Chapter 32, _Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Engineering_)

This chapter describes the role of scale modeling in engineering and related sciences. Accounts of scale modeling in philosophy rarely provide a correct description of how the practice is actually employed in engineering. This chapter corrects misconceptions about scale modeling often found in the philosophical literature. It also provides an informal explanation of how and why scale modeling works, when it does, in terms of an analogy between geometric similarity of plane figures and similarity of physically similar systems, which is founded on physics rather than on geometry. The key idea is to identify the relevant ratios responsible for the kind of similarity that is of interest, and then to characterize similarity in terms of a set of ratios that are the same (i.e., identical, or invariant) between the model system and the system it models. References to more extended treatments are provided for further reading

Kites, models and logic: Susan Sterrett investigates models in Wittgenstein's world

This is the text of Dr. Sterrett's replies to an interviewer's questions for simplycharly.com, a website with interviews by academics on various authors, philosophers, and scientists

How Beliefs Make A Difference (PhD dissertation)

How are beliefs efficacious? One answer is: via rational intentional action. But there are other ways that beliefs are efficacious. This dissertation examines these other ways, and sketches an answer to the question of how beliefs are efficacious that takes into account how beliefs are involved in the full range of behavioral disciplines, from psychophysiology and cognition to social and economic phenomena. The account of how beliefs are efficacious I propose draws on work on active accounts of perception. I develop an account based on a proposal sketched by the cognitive scientist Ulrich Neisser. Neisser sketched an active account of perception, on which dynamic anticipatory schemata direct an organism's exploration and action, and are in turn revised as a result of exploration and action. This notion of schema has roots in nineteenth century neurophysiology and in Frederick Bartlett's subsequent work on memory. Neisser appealed to it to unite what he thought was right about information-processing accounts of perception with what he thought was right about ecological accounts of perception. The point that we must anticipate in order to perceive has been recognized by philosophers in the form of the "theory-ladenness of observation." I extend the concept of anticipatory schema to include its role in social perception and social interaction; the concept of anticipatory schema provides a more interactive account of the role of expectations in the maintenance and existence of social institutions, and can be used to enrich the account of convention David Lewis provided. I also show that the concept of rational expectations, which explains the neutrality of money in terms of the efficacy of anticipatory expectations, is compatible with the proposed account of how beliefs are efficacious. I discuss how the proposal accounts for the three main modes by which beliefs can be efficacious: (i) via their role in causing intentional action, (ii) via their role in causing economic phenomena and the existence and maintenance of social institutions, and (iii) via their role in causing unintentional physiological responses, including anticipatory physiological responses that can enable perception, cause involuntary actions and give rise to the placebo effect